Universal Essence and Individual Essence: Toshihiko Izutsu “Consciousness and Essence”.
Universal Essence and Individual Essence: Toshihiko Izutsu, “Consciousness and Essence,”
Toshihiko Izutsu, Reading “Consciousness and Essence” (4) | Tetsuya Sekino
- Western philosophy views essence as a universal and abstract concept, whereas Eastern thought tends to be concerned with the individual and concrete.
- Izutsu expressed this difference in terms of the concepts of “universal essence” and “individual essence.
- This corresponds to the concepts “mahiyah” (universal essence) and “huwiyah” (individual essence) in Islamic philosophy.
- Both Basho and Rilke tried to go beyond/deny “maheya” and hang on to “huwiya,” but there was a difference in their attitudes.
- Basho did not deny “maheya” and made it compatible, whereas Rilke stuck to “hwiya” alone. Therefore, Rilke faced difficulties in linguistic expression.
- Izutsu himself takes the position of considering the relationship with “huwiyah,” while placing “mahiyah” at the center.
- The paper points out that the concept of the individual (τόδε τί) in Aristotle’s Metaphysics is not just an individual person (individuum), but a composite concept with a universal character (τί).
- In the creation of an individual, there are two processes involved: “individualization by material” and “speciation by form” (specification), and these two processes are interpreted as being inseparable.
- Specifically, it is explained that the individual (e.g., this tree), which is the material of generation, gives individuality (being this) to the product (e.g., this box) and at the same time loses its own individuality and constitutes part of the definition (species-form) of the product as a universal character (tree).
- In other words, in Aristotle, both matter and form work together to establish both the individuality and universality of the individual.
- This is also in line with Izutsu’s understanding. In the context of Oriental thought, Izutsu explored the possibility of the compatibility or simultaneous establishment of “individual essence” and “universal essence,” and it can be said that Aristotle also saw the duality of the universal and the individual in the individual as inseparable.
- It is clear that throughout the Western and Eastern classics, the question of the individuality and universality of essence continues to be an important issue in philosophy. I found the paper you refer to to be very helpful in clearly explaining Aristotle’s views on this issue.
The Essence of the Individual in Spinoza’s Ethica: Focusing on Part II, Definition II
Wataru Akiho (Keio University) PDF
Spinoza’s theory of the individual is discussed in detail in the attached article by Wataru Akiho, “The Essence of the Individual in Spinoza’s Ethica.
- Spinoza defines “a thing’s essence” in Part 2, Definition 2 of the Ethica, but interpretations differ as to whether this definition indicates the generality or individuality of the essence of an individual thing.
- Akibo states that it is difficult to read the individuality or generality of the essence directly from the definition itself, and then carefully analyzes the arguments for the three propositions (E2P10, E2P37, and E2P49) in which the definition is actually used.
- As a result, he argues that this definition illuminates different aspects of essence, such as its generality, individuality, and positivity, depending on the context, and in particular reveals the inner nature of conatus (self-preserving effort) as the essence of an individual thing.
- For Spinoza, Akiyasu concludes, the essence of an individual is a composite that includes both generality and individuality, which defines the reality of the individual. Each individual has its own unique essence, but at the same time, it adheres to its own existence because of the positive nature of its essence.
- I think this paper captures well the uniqueness and complexity of Spinoza’s view of the nature of the individual. I can see that Spinoza is presenting a multifaceted nature of the essence of the individual that cannot be reduced to a dichotomy between the universal and the individual.
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